Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 14. ABSTRACT Force caps and related command and control issues had a considerable influence on the conduct of operations in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This paper attempts to answer the question, "Did force caps prevent ground component commanders from prosecuting this war according to the Army's doctrinal concept of overwhelming force?" The significance of this paper is that the military will in all likelihood be called upon to operate with the constraint of force caps again in the future, and there are lessons to be learned from the way forces were implemented in Afghanistan. The methodology that brought the author to choose this topic was interviews with planners and operators who had first hand knowledge of the issues of the campaign and who identified force caps and command and control as the greatest issues of the campaign. Further research was then conducted using additional sources identified and discussed in Appendix-1-Literature Review. The paper starts with examples of how operations and logistics were impacted due to force caps and includes an account of the U.S. Marine's insertion into Forward Operating Base Rhino in Southern Afghanistan in November of 2002. The author describes how force caps created an ad-hoc force structure. This structure resulted in the generation of an overwhelming amount of requests for forces. These requests for forces went through many layers of lengthy approval processes. The author discusses the dangers of piecemeal commitment using the historical example "Task Force Smith" which occurred in July 1950 at the outset of the Korean War. The flattened command and control structure, the risks involved in limiting the amount of force, and issues of command relationships are also addressed. Reasons for the force caps are presented, including the strategic context that contributed to the limit on the number of forces. Recommendations are offered toward resolving issues assoicated with force caps. The ultimate finding is that we should deploy intact forces based on a troop to task analysis, but in the likely event that we are not able to do so, we should be prepared to be flexible and able to improvise. This flexibility and improvisational ability can be developed through training that required and encourages those attributes. Force caps and related command and control issues had a considerable influence on the conduct of operations in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This paper attempts to answer the question, "Did force caps prevent ground component commanders from prosecuting this war according to the Army's doctrinal concept of overwhelming force?" The significance of this paper is that the military will in all likelihood be called upon to operate with the constraint of force caps again in the future, and there are lessons to be learned from the way forces were implemented in Afghanistan. The methodology that brought the author to choose this topic was interviews with planners and operators who had first hand knowledge of the issues of the campaign and who identified force caps and command and control as the greatest issues of the campaign. Further research was then conducted using additional sources identified and discussed in Appendix-1-Literature Review. The paper starts with examples of how operations and logistics were impacted due to force caps and includes an account of the U
INTRODUCTION
The intent of this research was to discover if there were any operational level lessons learned by U.S. Army land forces planners in the Afghanistan Campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom. The initial methodology was primarily to conduct interviews with participating planners and operators. The aim of this approach was not to direct discussions toward specific areas or issues but for planners to speak to the issues that were of greatest importance to them.
Clearly, command and control was the overriding concern among interviewed planners and operators. Specifically, force limits and organizational structures and command relationships were the issues raised most often and seemed to cause the most consternation. Meeting mission requirements while working within force cap limits proved to be extremely difficult. As such, this paper addresses the question, "Did force caps prevent ground component commanders from Clausewitz refers to as fog and friction. The caps resulted in many unforeseen second and third order effects. Effects caused not by the enemy, but rather by the decision to implement a limitation to the number of forces allowed in theater. Specifically, the force caps influenced operations, force structure, and logistical support. In order to overcome these issues, requests for forces, known as RFF's, were initiated but the process could not respond quickly enough to meet the needs of commanders. The situation could have easily lent to a piecemeal commitment situation creating problems similar to that of Task Force Smith during the Korean War. Force caps not only lent to the creation of an ad-hoc force structure but also created a flat command and control structure. There were both operational and strategic rationales for the force caps. There was also a trade off between risk and limiting the amount of forces. The research further demanded a close look at the designation of command relationships and the need for the joint world to consider this when determining command relationships. Finally, some recommendations are offered regarding these issues. These recommendations include: the utilization of intact forces, the necessity of a troop to task analysis, the need for developing the ability to improvise, ways to overcome some of the pitfalls of ad-hoc organizations, designating command relationships, and the possibility of a standing JTF headquarters as well as a rapid deployment force.
THE IMPLICATIONS The Marines Land…sort of
On the twenty-ninth of November 2002, Marines and sailors from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of Task Force 58 (TF 58) were inserted into forward operating base Rhino in Southern Afghanistan. The plan was for the 15th MEU to secure the base, followed by the 26th MEU which would immediately move to gain the Kandahar area lines of communication. While the buildup was underway, commanders of Central Command (CINCCENT) and Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) told TF-58 that only 1,000 (later raised to 1,400) Marines and sailors would be allowed at Rhino. The force size limit imposed during the insertion caused a pause in operations and stopped the buildup of combat power. Planners had to reexamine and prioritize which personnel and equipment to transport.
The 15th MEU returned 102 staged personnel and equipment back to the USS Peleliu. The majority of the 26th MEU's personnel and equipment was retained aboard the USS Bataan.
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The sudden limit to the size of force allowed to go ashore resulted in a number of second and third order effects. Subordinate commanders who, during this operation, should have been able to focus on the task at hand, instead spent inordinate amounts of time determining which Marines and sailors to swap out, in order to bring in those whose skills were most critical.
Furthermore, the force cap caused TF 58 to tradeoff support assets for combat power, because of the uncertain security situation and because CENTCOM also wanted to get coalition forces into the fight. This caused TF 58 planners to continually assess and modify the flow of material into Rhino. The decrease in logistical assets available to TF 58 subsequently reduced the number of forces, such as SOF and coalition forces, that could be sustained from Rhino. Forces ashore had to assume more risk because the commander had to depend on force protection and reserve from shipborne forces 350 miles away. In future operations, and in order to accomplish the mission without impediment, the Marines ultimately chose to ignore the force caps, and CENTCOM conveniently did not bring the subject up.
3 This is but one illustration of how force caps influenced the operational mission in Operation Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan.
Force caps presented challenges not only for the Marines, but also for the planning and execution of operations of other American forces throughout the Afghanistan theater. In operations that commenced on the first of December, in the White Mountains around Tora Bora and Milawa, an estimated several hundred to several thousand al-Qaida were able to escape to neighboring Pakistan. There had been too much reliance on Afghan allies and air strikes rather than on the employment of a larger U.S. conventional force. This operation resulted in a proposal by General Franks to use "several hundred" conventional forces as a blocking force. Some respectively, also had to contend with the challenges imposed by the force cap, even as they were preparing for Operation Anaconda. The force caps lent to the following challenges: an ad-hoc command and force structure, lack of troops and force capabilities to meet mission requirements, the utilization and overuse of a cumbersome Request for Forces (RFF) process in order to meet force and capability shortfalls, and finally a flat organizational structure (devoid of subordinate headquarters). Furthermore, taskings continued to increase even as force caps continued to be imposed.
Ad-hocisms
One outcome of the decision to apply force caps was that an ad-hoc force structure was created in which forces did not deploy as they had been trained or organized. This was evident with the organizational structure of forces put together for the execution of Anaconda. Additionally, the force was now fighting without all of the tools they were used to utilizing during their combined arms training. This can be a serious detriment to the confidence of the force; a force that has trained with all of its combined arms capabilities, and then is suddenly fighting in a battle without being able to utilize all of those same elements of combat power. This causes doubts in the minds of the soldiers, because they must now operate differently from the way they have trained and because they are not as sure about how to fight when doing so without all of their battle operating systems.
7 COL David Gray, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., December 15, 2002. Furthermore, there were few forces available initially for the planning and execution of Anaconda. Many soldiers were also tied up providing security for a number of airfields in theater. Subsequent infantry units had to be brought in from Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and even Kuwait in order to be able to mass additional fighting force as the battle escalated and the enemy reinforced his own forces and used the cave system for protection.
Impact on Logistics
As stated in the ARCENT Initial Impressions Report, the overarching fact that impacted logistics support inside Afghanistan and surrounding countries was the United States Central 
Requests for Forces
Requirements for personnel increased as new operations developed. These included taskings from CENTCOM, such as "conduct detainee operations" and "sensitive site exploitation." RFFs were generated in order to meet the requirement for specific forces with the capabilities to meet these taskings. The slow process led to many unrealistic required delivery dates (RDDs) and latest arrival dates (LADs) in TPFDD (see figure 2) . 
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Piecemeal Commitment
The force caps for Operation Enduring Freedom could well have led to piecemeal commitment. "Piecemeal commitment" is defined in FM 3-90, Tactics, as the immediate employment of units in combat as they become available instead of waiting for larger aggregations of units to ensure mass or as the unsynchronized employment of available forces so that their combat power is not employed effectively. Battalion to a small two company, one artillery battery task force. Smith placed his forces east and west along the high ground overlooking Highway 1 at Juk Mi Pass, but North Korean tanks were able to overcome the small Task Force who withdrew and all captured US wounded were executed. Close air support had been nonexistent due to earlier fratricide incidents. They had effectively delayed the North Koreans for only seven hours.
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While this battle was taking place the 1/34 Infantry, 24th Infantry Division was digging in about ten kilometers south of Osan. The 34th Infantry Regiment had been rushed from Japan to backup TF Smith along Highway 1. On the sixth of July the North Koreans encountered the 1/34th Infantry. 1/34th Infantry encountered the same problems as TF Smith had as they had no anti-tank weapons that could stop T34s, nor could they tie in flank defenses. They fought for three hours before withdrawing. Fearing envelopment, the 3/34th
, which was to defend Ansong in a parallel position to the east of the 1/34th, withdrew without fighting.
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On the seventh of July, the Fourth North Korean Peoples Army Infantry Division left Pyong'taek moving south toward Ch'onan. By evening they were in Ch'onan. The 3/34th
Infantry successfully engaged the 4th NKPA ID reconnaissance elements north of town, then withdrew into Ch'onan.
20
The bulk of the 24th ID had arrived and continued the same small engagements and battles in a similar manner, as they were committed piecemeal against the North Koreans. They fought at Chonui, the Choch'iwon, the Kum River Line, and Taejon where the division Commander was captured. While these fights were taking place, the 1st Cavalry Division was boarding ships for Korea.
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As forces in Anaconda were without all of their tools including Apache gunship helicopters and artillery, so was the 24th Infantry Division limited in its war-fighting capabilities.
The 24th had artillery but no close air support, and they had only old powerless bazookas and 57-millimeter recoilless rifles with shells that bounced off the enemy's Soviet armor. 22 Neither were the forces that were brought in adequate for the operation, as was the case for Operation Enduring
Freedom. The 24th was limited in the size of its force due to inadequate transportation assets which was also one of the reasons given for the limit on the size of the force in Afghanistan, but CENTCOM's constraints were also political and mostly self imposed.
Flattened Command and Control Structures
Although some might argue that a flattened centralized command structure worked in China for Stillwell, this was mostly due to the environment in which he operated. For CENTCOM, the imposed force cap resulted in a flat command and control structure in which the CFLCC had direct command of too many subordinates units, rather than establishing enough intermediate commands to take over many of those responsibilities. Units, such as the 377th 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
Theater Support Command and the 416th Engineer Command (USAR), reported directly to ARCENT rather than to theater-level specialized commands. ARCENT also had direct oversight of logistical and medical assets who were themselves operating with a limited amount of forces and little host-nation support or contractors.
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In fact, the CFLCC initially had no subordinate corps or division-level headquarters but requested and received a Division Tactical Assault Command (DTAC) to assist in controlling operations, which resulted in 10th Mountain deployment. The CFLCC required units to continue to report to its headquarters, and did not task organize in a way that allowed lines of command such that the CFLCC (Forward) was provided the authority to direct and carry out ground operations. The CFLCC operated into the tactical level, even down to squad and detachment operations. The CFLCC actually operated at all levels of war, not only controlling the tactical level, but also conducting operational and even strategic missions including strategic reconnaissance and establishing an Office of Military Cooperation to rebuild the Afghan Army.
In reality, units up and down the chain of command were operating across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war without command guidance. In order to fulfill both their doctrinal role of ARCENT Headquarters, while also acting as the tactical headquarters, many augmentees, well above what was required for their is doctrinal role, were required.
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Furthermore, information operations were intended to give the commander more situational awareness, but in reality the outcome in Operation Enduring Freedom was that more personnel were required in order to process information. If the numbers required are also a part of the counted force in theater, situational awareness may be gained at the expense of boots on the ground for the warfight. Perhaps the Joint Forces Headquarters should look to have a complimentary force where the tactical should have some equity in collaboration with the HQ.
Should the balance of forces and decision go to the HQ with the highest rank, or should there be a complimentary balance of input from and forces to, the tactical level?
Another result of the flattened structure was that it meant information sometimes went directly to the highest levels, thwarting the chain of command, and generating requests for information (RFIs) that should not have been made. The CFLCC was out of the loop and had to respond to these RFIs that, in many cases, could have been resolved at a lower level.
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This structure, where the CFLCC was operating at all levels of war, is contrary to doctrine and spreads the CFLCC HQ too thin to do the job well. According to FM 3-0,
Operations, operational commanders conduct offensive campaigns and major operations to achieve theater-level effects based on tactical actions. They concentrate on designing offensive land operations. They determine what objectives will achieve decisive results; where forces will operate; the relationship among subordinate forces in time, space, and purpose; and where to apply the decisive effort. Operational commanders assign area of operations to establish command and support relationship among tactical commanders. Tactical commanders direct offensive operations to achieve the objectives of destroying enemy forces or seizing terrain that produce the theater-level effects operational commanders require.
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The CFLCC should not directly supervise the fight; rather, this should be left to subordinate commanders at corps and division levels or in this case the CFLCC (forward). The CFLCC should conduct operational-level tasks, such as those indicated in the previous paragraph. 
Why Force Caps?
The question thus emerges, Why did the US military depart from doctrine? According to a case study by Colonel John Bonin, General Tommy Franks, the Combatant Commander for Central Command wanted to avoid the mistakes made by the Soviets during its war in Afghanistan. He sought to avoid appearing as an occupying force and did not wish to provide additional targets for the enemy. Thus, the number of forces throughout the theater was kept to about 7,000.
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According to the ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions report, limited strategic lift assets, limited infrastructure in the area of responsibility, and the concern for force protection were what drove the U.S. Central Command Commander to impose strict limits on the numbers of personnel deployed within the AOR.
Sometimes there were operational reasons for not committing troops. For example, a planner said, At the time of Tora Bora LTG Mikoloshek, CFLCC Commander, felt that the risk in using TF 58 far exceeded its benefits as we had every indication that AntiTaliban Afghan General Ali would quit the field if large numbers of U.S. forces arrived. Politically, this could have been a disaster as a forced liberation of Kandahar by U.S forces would not have provided the catalyst necessary for proKarzai tribal support in the mostly Pashtun region. Without that, I personally don't believe we would have seen a Loya Jirga (new national government agreed to by all the tribes) only 6 months later. Operationally the need to let the Afghans liberate their own territory for the follow on ops was essential. This was the major reason that TF-58 was 'held' for contingencies--postured at Bagram or Jalalabad for clearing ops based on enemy disposition. The unique unconventional nature of the war, combined with the impacts of introducing large numbers of conventional force, weighed heavily on the decisions made by the leadership. But as to the numbers that they could introduce at Rhino, this seemed to us to stem from force caps imposed by GEN Franks to reduce the footprint or perception of large conventional forces in a region that we still hoped would generate its own friendly forces for a better post-conflict make up.
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Strategic Political Considerations
A further question arises, Did strategic political considerations play a role in the desire to limit the forces in Afghanistan? Although many planners felt that these decisions were being made at the Combatant Commander level, the reality may be otherwise. Bob Woodward's book Bush at War reveals that the Bush administration was also concerned about appearing as an occupying force, and that there was a concern about getting bogged down in Afghanistan, as had the British in the nineteenth century and the Soviets in the twentieth. This concern led the administration to think about military action elsewhere. The author describes Paul Wolfowitz, 
Command Relationships
This monograph would not be complete without a discussion of Command relationships.
Unity of command is one of the primary tenets of the Army's doctrine and a principle of war.
Through unity of command Joint Forces achieves unity of effort. However, unity of command seems one of the most difficult of principles to put into practice, and the Operation Enduring Freedom campaign in Afghanistan proved no exception. The command structure and command relationships employed did not support unity of effort. This situation was only overcome through personal relationships.
According to the ARCENT IIR, at the strategic level JFLCC believed the CENTCOM staff to be Air Force centric. The staff looked at the theater with an eye toward targets, through a ninety-six hour window. If an operation was not to happen within ninety-six hours, it was not a priority. Neither did the JFLCC staff have much understanding of the requirements of ground operations. They gave a ninety-six hour response time for planning air strikes and in the same message gave an infantry force only four hours to be on the ground after an air strike on a sensitive target. The ARCENT report summarizes with this, "An infantry force cannot be dropped onto a target as fast as one can drop a bomb. Such a force must be protected and resourced, not just for a few minutes over the target but for hours and days."
40 At the strategic level the staff needs to give thought and effort to long-range problems, allowing the development and provision of good guidance to components commands, thus allowing each the time it needs to properly react.
The JFLCC staff believed they did not have adequate access to the Combatant Commander in order to confirm planning guidance. Several planning processes took place at Central Command Headquarters under the direction of senior staff officers and along with their subordinate planners. Three groups conducted operational planning: the operations planning element (OPE), the future planning element (FPE), and the long-range planning element (LRPE).
Component commands, acting on information from these staffs, proceeded with parallel planning.
This worked well when the commander's intent was understood, but in the early days of the campaign, the rapid pace of events precluded waiting for plans from CENTCOM. ARCENT would often publish plans in advance of CENTCOM, so as to remain operationally agile, only to have those plans sometimes not be executed. The results of higher headquarters planning must trickle down to subordinate headquarters in order to achieve effective parallel planning, and this was not always the case.
Command relationships were not clearly defined at all levels. This was most apparent in 
RECOMMENDATIONS
There are two schools of thought as to US Army's military organizational structure and its approach to war-fighting. Some strongly believe that the Army should fight as it has trained and organized. This requires a good troop to task analysis to pair troops with mission requirements. Others believe the Army needs to become more flexible and that if it is going to fight ad hoc, it should also train that way. This type of approach requiring flexibility and adaptability calls for training that encourages improvisation. Furthermore, the best way to overcome issues associated with "ad-hoc" organizations may be through already established 42 
Intact Forces
In operations there are inherently many situations lending to fog and friction. To add to this friction, putting together ad-hoc or piecemeal teams, especially for combat, only adds to the complexity. Here is what one planner had to say:
Combatant Commands have no combat forces and must put together pick up teams when the hotspots are in their area of operation. Although there are contingency plans on the shelf, each combatant Commander goes after the Ateam when they have a job to do. For example, the 101st is on nearly everyone's TPFFD across the globe. As it happens, units get deployed on other contingencies or day-to-day Army missions that preclude immediate deployment for events unforeseen. It would be better to go after an intact unit that is already ready, than parts of one you would like to have. The Command and Control and relationship factor, I believe, would overcome many obstacles. Our units are made up of many soldiers and leaders that have served in all those other units anyway with a broad base of experience. Units can figure out how to get the job done with the right tools---like an intact fighting force---even if their patch is different than the TPFDD.
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Russell further stated, "The marines, navy and air force all fight with intact deployment packages and rarely break up their organizations to deal with force caps. The fact that 'Rhino' was so foreign to them with regard to limitations on numbers of troops reinforces the argument.
In this vein, I make the case that the army should be allowed to do the same as the other Afghanistan, there was no well-defined campaign plan; therefore, there was no clearly stated mission. Thus, it was difficult to determine tasks required to meet that mission and subsequently, difficult to do a troop-to-task analysis. One cannot easily determine forces required without the benefit of being able to define or predict what tasks will be required.
Force constraints, request for forces procedures, and mobility constraints caused a departure from a doctrinal approach to resourcing and commanding the campaign. Some believe the Army should depart from doctrine for solutions only when required due to threat, mission, and desired end states. Rather planners should reinforce troops to task methodologies for resourcing the campaign.
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Of course the best option is to fight as the Army has trained, with the intact combined arms teams it is accustomed to, rather than as ad hoc organizations, missing parts of their combined arms team. In operations there inherently exist too many opportunities lending to fog and friction. To add to this friction by putting together pick-up teams, especially for combat, only adds to the complexity. The Army has well-trained, cohesive organizations already established and should use them. This, of course, would be the ideal option.
The Art of Improvisation
If the Army is not going to utilize intact forces then it must ensure that leaders, staffs and soldiers are able to be flexible and able to improvise. In future operations the Army will not always be able to operate as the neat combined arms elements it has trained as and is familiar with. It is likely there will be force caps and ad hoc structures in future operations. That so many found planning for, and working within, this operational constraint to be a dilemma may mean 47 Bush at War 48 CALL, Initial Impressions Conference that the military is not as good at improvising as it should be. Indeed, those interviewed were able to improvise as their success in the operation showed, but pointed out that the real issue underlying constant improvisation is the degree of risk incurred by the fighting forces as a result.
The degree of risk incurred will be situational and depend on the quality of the enemy force and will.
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In order to encourage leaders to better overcome problems such as force caps we must Rather, the Army needs to construct training that causes leaders, planners, and soldiers to think innovatively in order to find solutions to problems such as force caps.
Another way to encourage innovative thinking is with less evaluative oversight, perhaps in favor of more teaching. The Army culture is one that says the only good training is evaluative training with operator-controllers looking over one's shoulder. The cultural thinking is that without operator controllers, it is not really training. Such evaluative training tends to stymie necessary creative thinking and risk taking. The learning point should be more outcome based, 49 Gray Interview rather than doctrine based, where one might ask, Did it work? rather than an OC asking, Did it work in accordance with this pub or that pub? Furthermore, the Army needs a setting where discovering that a possible selected option for a solution did not work was also part of the learning process and is not seen in a negative light, for in experimentation and failure commanders, planners and soldiers have also learned. In order to encourage innovative thinking the Army must allow a training environment that gives commanders and staffs more opportunity for risk taking in their decision-making. This should be an environment where risk taking is encouraged and rewarded. One planner stated, "Leaders should be held accountable for training the units that they will fight. This includes their being able to conduct their own honest after action reviews and evaluations of their unit training as sometimes we get too wrapped up in outside observations."
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As for logistics, in the Army's desire to be a smaller more rapidly deployable force, it must find the right balance between living as minimalists in austere conditions (which would no doubt have secondary influences on morale) versus having everything one might need and more.
Obviously, the more forces and battle systems one has, the more support is required. The question becomes where does one draw the line? Rommel said, "The battle is won by the quartermaster before it ever starts". 51 In the Army's efforts to be a lean, quick to react force, expectations for support remain high. This will require a mindset change in the Army, a cultural shift, but as a learning organization the Army must find the best balance.
As for the RFF process, under this innovation construct, one might recognize that the RFF process is slow and leads to unrealistic RDDs and LADs in the TPFDD. The joint staff would be able to find a way to refine the crisis action RFF and DEPORD process to make it 50 Ibid.
51 Col Stephen F. Garret. "Synchronizing Battlefield Logistics" Military Review, March-April 1997 faster. Some believe that it is too dependent on the traditional TPFDD methodology and that a push system rather than a pull system is required.
Overcoming "ad hockery"
Forces in theater were able to overcome much of the ad hoc nature of the force structure due to three factors: doctrine, collaborative planning, and personal relationships.
Colonel Gray, C3 for CFLCC (Forward) stated, Despite occasional disputes over the meaning of some definitions, joint doctrine provided a framework that our planners could turn to as an aid in structuring the CJTF, and as the basis for the Joint Operations they were going to do. The commonality of people knowing, at least in the U.S. services, how this was going to work helped. As for the major allies who were going to get into the fight, the Australians, the Canadians and later the Brits, they were NATO partners. Our processes are not too far apart so we, by and large, understand how to operate together. A second way the CJTF overcame was through collaborative planning. The key was involving all the subordinate headquarters in the planning process right up front. Their planners and S3's were coming into the planning bays and helping us. They got a voice in the plan's development. That the principle subordinate units collocated a forward command posts at Bagram greatly benefited teambuilding and better contributed to a common understanding of the operation. …. Finally, the role of personality in war is huge. Although the various units had never worked together previously, various commanders and staff members knew their key counterparts in higher headquarters and throughout the major subordinate units. For example, I had worked together with the CFLCC C3 -COL Mike Hawrylak -during a previous assignment. Our and a couple of CFLCC planners knew each other from SAMS. MG Hagenback knew COL Wiercinski as well as some of the Aussies and special ops folks from past assignments. . …They knew each other and each other's capabilities, and it helped make Anaconda work.
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This speaks to the importance of a common operating picture provided by doctrine and the value of all forces being well schooled in that joint doctrine, as well as the importance of providing opportunities for networking and building relationships via exercises, attendance at residence schools (instead of distance learning). In fact, the greatest outcome of school attendance may be in the opportunity to network and build relationships.
Command Relationships
Command and control structures, with a lack of clearly defined command relationships, present the most difficulty. Echelons of command should be doctrinally employed to meet command and control requirements and support requirements of subordinate elements. That said, perhaps units should be more modularized in order to more easily fit mission requirements while maintaining unit cohesion. However, the trend is toward less Headquarters elements. This may be possible, but requires the Joint Forces Commands, and the Army, to relook carefully command structures as they exist now, and perhaps rebuild organizational structures in order to meet this new design trend. 
JTF Headquarters and Revisiting the Rapid Deployment Force
A standing plug-and-play-type JTF HQ, with both soundly thought out subordinate structures and clearly defined subordinate command relationships and a willingness to decentralize authority to subordinate HQs may be a more efficient model. This idea will have to overcome service cultures and requires additional training methodologies to create effective joint task forces.
The concept of a standing JTF HQ along with a standing rapid reaction force was explored during the Carter administration with an eye toward focusing for low-intensity conflict utilizing conventional forces. The thought was to develop a light infantry suitable for rapid deployment to overseas trouble spots. Special forces would make up a small part of this. In political considerations and the above stated goal. Ultimately our military must be able to be flexible in the way it operates and responds to any missions that may transpire, especially if the trend toward force caps is to be the norm. In this case the army need not pretend that we will fight as doctrine states, with overwhelming force, but rather, our country and our leadership at all levels must understand, and be willing to accept the trade-off required in terms of risks and impacts, and there are many, associated with this trend toward utilizing less force. In this case the required flexibility can only be achieved through situational training that requires improvisation, and well-designed organizational structures, as well as the aforementioned relationship building.
APPENDIX -1 LITERATURE REVIEW
The research materials for this study included case studies, reports, briefings, news articles, and interviews and correspondence with planners and operators who had firsthand experience with the issues associated with this monograph. The following is a review of each of the documents and interviews associated with the writing of this report.
The first document is a case study entitled members were, in fact, the impetus for this study. Once these overriding concerns were discovered, efforts were focused on obtaining input from these officers as to why force caps were in place, the resulting command and control structure, the RFF process, and how the mission was affected by the force caps.
The fourth of June 2002 issue of the Washington Post contains an article, "War Report Criticizes Distant Command." In this article, the author discusses the problems associated with CENTCOM's distant command and, more relevant to this study, raises the issue of force caps.
The Marines had to return forces to ships. This was done without much knowledge of the rationale for the force cap. Bush at War, by Bob Woodward, provided a strategic political background for this paper, and the background as to political and diplomatic constraints that would come to influence the way the forces would be used. This book describes the George W. Bush administration's reaction to the events of 11 September, 2001. Of particular interest for the writing of this subject were: (1) the administrations development of achievable military goals, and (2) how the military element of power was to be utilized in order to achieve those strategic objectives. Seymour Hersh's article in the New Yorker, "Offense and Defense," and Ralph Peters article "Shock, Awe and Overconfidence," further provided insight into the administrations desire to change the Army force into a leaner, more technologically driven fighting force. The articles relate to the war plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom where Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was said to have pushed Army leadership toward using less forces than the leadership believed would be adequate for the operation. The articles apply to this paper as they offer perspective as to why the administration would desire to limit force.
Gaining historical examples and perspectives was also important to the writing of this paper. The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919 Doctrine, -1939 , by Robert Allen Doughty explains the reasons for France's inability to effectively fight the Germans in World War Two principally that they had trained, organized and equipped, developed their doctrine, and strategized for the wrong type of war. This is contrasted with the success of the German Army who had made leaps in their approach to warfare. The significance of this book to the writing of this paper is in the lessons to be learned from the German Army Command and Control system. The Germans were able to operate with flexibility and also saw the benefits of, and were effective at, decentralized decision making. Infantry Division to the Korean Peninsula in order block the enemy advance. This historical event has many implications for the Army of today as it is still contending with many of the same issues the 24th faced during their mission.
"Carter and the Special Operations Elite" is an article that included information about attempts in the late 1970s to put together a rapid reaction force. This was to include a standing headquarters along with standby conventional forces of airborne and light infantry, as well as some special forces. The concept was beginning to be realized, but was shelved when a change of administration caused a return to a more traditional larger force that would continue to give focus to the Cold War, and a reliance on special forces for counterinsurgency missions. The concept is explored more deeply in this paper as it seems worthy of further investigation for a possible way to construct forces and conduct operations in the future.
Field Manuals (FMs) 3-0, Operations, and 3-90, Tactics, provide doctrinal definitions and principles relevant to the subject topic. FM 3-0 defines the roles of commands at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It further discusses the principles of war including mass.
All of the above references proved helpful to this project, but a few in particular were especially of value. Bush at War was especially useful as it provided the strategic context for this paper.
The First Year: US Army Forces Central Command During
Operation Enduring Freedom by John A. Bonin Colonel, USA (Ret.) was a well written paper that documented many of the events of the Operation in Afghanistan. The CALL paper from the Initial Impressions conference was especially useful in that it brought out many of the lessons learned in the campaign that related well to this paper. The Marine reports were also helpful in that they provided an example of the issues discussed here.
Finally, and probably the most useful, were the interviews with the planners and operators who as earlier stated were the impetus for this study.
